In this section Keller attempts to defend Christianity against the charge that it is restrictive, that it constrains an individuals ability to decide what is moral. Since this is obviously true, he argues that it’s actually a good thing. He sites examples from the physical world, like a pianist who practices for many, many hours to become a virtuoso. His thought being that the restriction of freedom while learning, since the pianist can’t be doing whatever he wants and must instead practice, is good, because it allows him to have freedoms he would not have otherwise when he is a master and can play music he never would be able to otherwise. He then goes on to explain that not all restrictions are good and that one must find the right restrictions. From here he asserts that spiritual freedoms should adhere to restrictions as his physical examples do. As argument he uses purport that people believe that some actions are immoral regardless of the beliefs of the person acting, therefor concluding that those people believe in an objective morality, a restrictive framework which must be adhered too, as with the physical world.
There are too many things wrong with this section for me to cover them all. Here a few that bother me the most, in no particular order.
Keller fails to provide any argument that Christianity is a good thing in all of this. Assuming you believe everything in his statements, he still has never provided anything to make you think that Christianity would be the correct restrictive framework. He has provided no list of benefits to your spiritual well being, no evidence of it’s superiority to Hinduism, or Scientology, or Placebo. He didn’t even bother to write a compelling hypothetical. This indicates to me that his position in this section is a post hoc rationalization, and not a position logically reached from a neutral starting point, or he would not have omitted such an important step.
If I give Keller a charitable interpretation I can read this section as an argument not that Christianity’s restrictions are good, but merely that they are not always bad. Maybe he only means to point out that you can’t just assume from that mere fact of restrictions that something is bad, and this is true. However, if this is what he is arguing he is missing the point. The complaint is not really that there are restrictions, more that there are too many restrictions. He has to make the case that the restrictions put on the Christian mind are more beneficial, or less harmful, than the lack of those restrictions, the ability to sample a variety of moral philosophies and choose ones favorites, and make a personal amalgamation. I guess he thinks he has done this with his argument that there is an objective morality because he has an implied premise that Christianity knows this objective morality perfectly. It must be perfect, otherwise people making up their own versions might be superior. This is a huge unstated premise, that has zero evidence or logical basis. It is a version of the common circular logic, the Bible says I’m right and I’m right because I’m following the Bible.
Perhaps Keller thinks of Christianity as a helpful tutor. A guide that helps people learn about the Truth of morality. But it is only possible to think this way if one is already a believer, you have to have faith that Christianity is the keeper of the knowledge of objective morality. If you don’t accept that claim, then Christianity is just another belief system, one that discourages free individuals (mostly children) from exploring alternative possibilities out of fear that they will choose the “wrong” answer. It is a reasonable thing to do, given the assumptions of a Christian believer, but they are unnecessary assumptions, not shared by everyone.
Finally, I should point out and argue with Keller’s flimsy evidence supporting the notion that there is such a thing as objective morality, on which his whole argument in this case rests. In the section he tells of a frequent exchange that he feels makes his point. A doubter will say, “People should be able to make up their own minds about what is moral,” and he will respond with a question, “Is there someone out there doing something right now that you think should stop, regardless of what that person believes?” to which the doubter will reply, “Yes.” Keller will then feel they have shown that they believe in a moral truth outside of the belief of the actor, but this has not been shown. The doubter has only admitted to not agreeing with the moral stance of someone else, and nothing about who is right or wrong.
Keller should ask, “Can you objectively show that someone should stop their activity, regardless of their beliefs?” to which the answer would be “No,” if we’re being strict about it. Any objective measure, would rely on a value judgement somewhere. Should that man stop murdering people? Only if you value their right to live as greater than his right to kill. Just because pretty much everyone agrees with those values, doesn’t mean it’s objective, it’s still a value judgement.
I didn’t like this section. I feel like Keller himself doesn’t believe what he’s saying, so he sorta just skipped passed it quickly. The take home message is that he’s right that restrictions alone are not a reason to condemn something, however, he has done nothing to refute the complaint that Christianity is unnecessarily and harmfully restrictive to individual believers. His hand waving arguments are distractions, and poor ones at that.